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Chapter III
On June 18th the Repuhlican Convention, composed of one
thousani seventy-eight delegates, met at Chicago: of these five
hundred and forty were necessary to a choice of a presidential
candidate. It was evident that the contest "between President
Taft and Roosevelt would he a very close one, really depending
upon who won the two hundred forty -eight contested seats, for
neither had a majority without them. The Republican National
Committee, which had heen chosen hy the Convention of 1908 was
controlled hy Senator Penrose of Pennsylvania and Senator Murra^
Crane of Massachusetts, Under the leadership of these reaction-
aries, sufficient Taft delegates were seated temporarily and al-
lowed to vote on the contested delegations, to give Taft a
majority and hence the candidacy. The Roosevelt delegation amid
scenes of wildest pandemonium tried again and again to stop the
"steam roller" tactics hut it was impossible to break through
the iron rule of the chairman, KLihu Root, once the old associ-
ate and friend of Roosevelt's, The party machine had triumphed
in the nomination of Taft but in so doing they had destroyed
party unity. Most of the Roosevelt delegates, at his sugges-
tion, had refrained from voting or participating in the proceed-
ings of the Convention. '.Vhen the roll call was ended, the vote
stood as follows: Taft 561, Roosevelt 107, LaFollette 41,
Cummins 17, Hughes 2, present and not voting 349, Taft thus
received but 21 votes more than v/ere necessary for nomination.

In analyzing this vote various deductions have "been made,
Roosevelt in an editorial entitled "Thou Shalt Not Steal" in
the Outlook of July 12th 1913 claims that Taft's scant majority
of twenty-one was fraudulent and so "all claim to an honest
majority disappears," LaPollette, on the other hand, was cer-
tain that Roosevelt could not claim a majority either. The
Roosevelt members of the Committee challenged Tout seventy-two oi
those delegates reputed to he Taft's, Few if all of these were
given to Roosevelt it would not even then have assured him the
nomination. The truth of the matter was that the methods pur-
sued in 1912 v/ere no different from those used in 1908, hut the
bitterness of the struggle made them seem more obnoxious.
When Colonel Roosevelt in his headquarters at the Congress
Hotel, realized that his cause was lost, throuarh fraud, as he
believed, he paced the floor, meditating his next move. Mr,
George Perkins and llr. Prank Munsey 7/ere talking in rapid whis-
pers in one corner, then both advanced towards Roosevelt, each
placing a hand on one of his shoulders said, "Colonel, we will
see you through", while Munsey added, in tense tones, "My for-
1
tune, my magazine and my newspapers are with you," That, to
Amos Pinchot who witnessed the scene, was to mark the birth of
the Progressive Party, The next step was to hold a meeting of
all the Roosevelt followers, v/herein a speech to the delegates,
he advised them to return home and test the sentiment of their
constituency and, if they found it favorable, to meet at a
later time to decide the advisability of creating a new party.
Bowers, Claude G., Sever idge and the Progressive Era, 420
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Before dispersing they set up a Committee, which on July 8th,
issued a call to all progressively-inclined people of the United
States to meet in convention on August 5th at Chicago for the
first Progressive National Convention.
The call to a convention presented a challenge to many
Bepuhlicans who admired Roosevelt greatly as to whether they
should break their party ties completely. Many of them had
hoped that the Hepuhlican party might be purged from within and
become truly progressive under Roosevelt's leadership. To such
the ITational Convention had been a bitter disappointment. Chief
among these was Governor Hadley of Missouri, one of the seven
governors who had urged Roosevelt to become a candidate. When
he decided to stay with the Republican Party, some of the Pro-
gressives expressed their resentment, but Roosevelt said, "He
1
will not be with us, but we must not blame him." Senator
Cummins who had with other insurgents made such a heroic fight
on the Payne Aldrich Tariff declined to leave the Republican
Party perhaps because of "what it had stood for in days gone by,"
and in response to Beveridge's plea replied, "I am profoundly
convinced that it is easier to substitute a new leadership in
the Republican Party, than to build up a new organization to
2
such power as to enable it to influence legislation."
Senator Beveridge likewise felt a deep attachment to the
party of his youth and manhood. Yet he was also ardently de-
voted to Roosevelt, for whom he had campaigned intensively be-
fore the Convention. Disillusioned as he was in the Republican
Thayer, V/illiam Roscoe, Theodore Roosevelt , 372
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Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Bra. 446

Party, he felt the need of a new party which should build upon
the principles of the old, yet withal be more progressive and
more responsive to human needs. Yet if there was to be any de-
gree of permanence, it must be built upon something more than
the personal grievance of one individual. While Eoogevelt's
great popularity would give a nev/ third party a great impetus,
yet it would not last over other campaigns unless there were in-r
herent, fundamental, vital principles. After conferring with
the Progressive leaders - among them his intimate friends,
Perkins and Munsey, he announced his willingness to join the
new party if it would adopt a program of political and social
reforms and if it would continue aggressively in the future
though defeated that year. Upon receiving these assurances, he
publicly announced nis adherence to the Progressive Party and
was selected as chairman of the Convention and its upening
1
spealcer •
It was not to be expected that LaPollette would join the
now party because of the personal issues involved but he did
apparently -cry to weigh fairly its effect upon the progress of
reform for which he had fought during over a quarter of a cen-
tury. To him acceptance of Roosevelt's candidacy was based up-
t
on personal loyalty rather than upon clearly defined principles.
Roosevelt's evasion of tariff reform during his term as presi-
dent and his failure to check the development of trusts condemn-
ed him in LaFollette's estimation as a v/orthy leader of the
Progressive movement, however effectively he might preach civic
"l
" ~ ——== =============™==_===========^^
Bov/ers, Claude G,, Beveridge and the Progressive Era , 423-424
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LaFollette, Robert M., Autobiography, 644,617
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righteousness. So he preferred to remain with the Hepuhlican
Party.
The first Progressive national Convention met in Chicago
on August 5th, consisting of two thousand delegates and a far
greater numher of interested spectators. It was an unusual
gathering, marked by an unusual spirit of religious fervor and
enthusiasm. To one who looked down upon that great sea of faces,
there was evidence of an exaltation of spirit like that of
|j
Crusaders of old. Here were gathered men of standing in their
various communities who had "battled for years for purer T)Olitics,
now rejoicing that their hopes were ahout to be realized. Soc-
ial workers like Miss Jane Addsuns, and level-headed business
men mingled with the few sentimentalists whom Roosevelt later
referred to as the "lunatic fringe" and a few of the old time
politicians who v;ere in the nev/ party for what they could get
out of it.
Some of the delegations received great applause as they
marched into the hall with their flying banners. California,
following behind Hiram Johnson, proudly displayed theirs on
which was written:
"I want to be a Bull Moose
And with the Bull Moose stand
With antlers on my forehead
And a big stick in ray hand."
Oscar S. Straus, the great Jewish philanthropist, led the
New York delegation down the aisle singing fervently,"^
"Onward Christian soldiers
i
Marching as to war."
Bowers, Claude G., Beveridge and the Progressive Bra , 425

The keynote of the convention was sounded "by Senator
Beveridge in an extraordinary speech, picturing in language
well nigh faultless the ideals of social and economic Justice
which were to hring hope and happiness to the great mass of the
American people. The appearance of Roosevelt was greeted v/ith
wildest enthusiasm. His address to the convention, which he
called a "confession of faith", closed with the words which he-
came a sort of "battle cry through the campaign: "We stand at
1
Armageddon and we hattle for the Lord." He was nominated by
acclamation, as was the candidate for the vice presidency -
Governor Hiram Johnson of California,
The party name adopted was "Progressive." In addition to
political changes, the platform presented a definite program
of social and industrial justice, which seemed rather idealis-
tic then, but has since "been almost completely adopted and made
into law by the Democratic Party, with the help of Roosevelt's
own Progressives. It recommended the direct primary; popular
election of United .States senators: the initiative, referendum
and recall, including the recall of Judicial decisions; woman
suffrage; registration of lobbyists, and great publicity of
campaign funds. It favored strengthening the Sherman Ant i -Trust
Law, and denounced the Payne -Aldrich tariff. It urged the need
of laws regarding child labor, minimum wage, industrial health
and accidents and social insurance.
Many similar measures were to be found in the platform of
the Democratic Party which had been adopted a few weeks before

at their convention in Baltimore (June 25th). Reversing the
usual procedure, the candidates were chosen before the platform
was adopted. A real schism seemed almost inevitable between
the conservative and liberal wings of the party, but through
the leadership of William Jennings Bryan this was averted and
the party was preserved intact. The candidates favored by the
conservatives were Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio and Congress-
man Oscar Underwood of Alabama, chairman of the House Committee
on Ways and Means: - by the Progressives Governor Woodrow
Wilson of New Jersey. Speaker J.B. ("Champ") Clark of ITissourl
tried to keep in with both factions. Even before the balloting
began, Bryan introduced a resolution which fl) reaffirmed the
party's position as "the champion of popular government and
equality before the law" and (2) declared against the nominatiori
of any candidate representing, or under obligation to J .P.
Morgan, T.F. Ryan, Augustus Belmont, or any of the "privilege-
1
hunting and favor -seeking class." Naturally this caused a
great uproar, but the resolution was nevertheless overv/helming-
ly adopted.
The convention contained 1,092 delegates, and 728 votes
were necessary to nominate. Bryan was opposed to Governor
Harmon, believing him to be a friend of Wall Street, Assuming
leadership of the Progressive forces, Bryan was determined that
the Democrats should not get into the same difficulties that thd
Republicans were in. He cast his ballot at first for Speaker
Clark as Nebraska had instructed her delegates to do. Speaker
Democratic National Convention of 1912, Official Report of
Proceedings, 129-128
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Clark had a majority, but was far from having the required two-
thirds majority, while Governor Wilson was more than one hun-
dred votes behind. "7hile the fourteenth ballot was being taken,
Bryan startled the convention by announcing that he should
transfer his vote from Clark, to V/ilson because the ITew Yortt
delegates were in the hands of Charles F. Murphy, leader of
Tammany Hall, arid Murphy had transferred his support from
Harmon to Clark, He insisted that the Convention nominate some-J
one entirely free from the taint of Tammany support. Gradually
Wilson began to gain and was nominated on the forty-sixth
ballot. Governor Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana was nominated
for Vice-President.
Once more Bryan's influence was apparent in the platform
adopted. It called for immediate dowmard revision of the tar-
iff and new trust legislation which would maHe private monopoly
impossible. It favored the revision of banking and currency
laws, a single tern for the president, and independence for the
Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government was establish-
ed. Corporations should not be permitted to contribute to cam-
paign funds.
Thus the Democratic Party emerged from its convention with
a candidate whose progressive achievement was unquestioned, a
platform advocating definite reforms, and a degree of unity and
enthusiasm which augured well for its success at the polls in
November
,
The campaign which f ollov/ed was probably as exciting as
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any ttiat had ever been experienced up to this time, Roosevelt
swept across the country dramatizing himself as a crusader of
civic righteousness. His bitter attacks upon President Taft
alienated some of his former supporters while others v/ere
genuinely alarmed by that ''ill-starred trio" - the initiative,
referendum and recall of judicial decisions," It was feared
that this would lead to a complete breakdov/n of constitutional
government and Hoosevelt was forced to spend most of his time
defending them. Yet the general enthusiasm accorded him made
it evident that the real struggle lay between him and the Pro-
gressive Democrat, Governor V/ilson, That the campaign was well
financed was apparent by the lavish expenditures during these
months, Hoosevelt was criticized for his associations with
Big Business, especially Mr, Perkins, who was an official of
the International Harvester Oompanj'' and partner of J.P. Morgan
and Company, But Roosevelt *s defense was that Mr. Perkins was
sincerely anxious to see the relations between business and
government and labor and capital on a better basis, and was
trying to help him accomplish this.
During the height of the campaign, Roosevelt was shot in
Milwaukee by a half-crazed fanatic but the wound was not fatal.
He remained quietly out of the campaign until the last few days
before the election. Then he made one of the greatest speeches
of his career at Madison Square Garden pledging his "life if
need be for righteousness and for brotherhood and for the wel-
fare of mankind."
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Although the Progressive Party did not attain the success
they had hoped for at the polls, they did, nevertheless, make a
remarkahle showing, considering the short time they had had for
organizing. Most of the leaders and the rank and file expected
that the nev/ party had come to stay and that in another four
years it would have attained even greater strength, just as the
Repuhlican Party had from 1656 to I860, Roosevelt himself did
not share the hopefulness of his follov/ers.
The Repuhlicans waged a comparatively quiet campaign, in
vi^ich the President did not take a very active part. He did,
however, defend the record of his administration and warned the
country against the new and untried theories advanced by Roose-
velt, asserting that the Progressive Party was a product of pe^^
sonal ambition and its platform a veritable "crazy quilt,"
President Taft himself was held in high esteem, but his politi-
cal associates were to many people extremely undesirable. It
apparently did not matter that the country had made a real ad-
vance toward progressive government under his administration. A
postal savings and parcel post system had been instituted; a
constitutional amendment for an income tax submitted to the
states; and another for the direct election of senators passed
by Congress; civil service expanded; and an eight hour law for
government employees adopted. All of this apparently v/as ob-
scured by the indignation over the Payne-Aldrich tariff. It
was his misfortune to follow a most brilliant political leader
so that his mild, gentle way made him seem in contrast prosy
64
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and dull, or as Hoot expressed it, "it was like a change from an
auto to a cab 1 "
^
During SeptemlDer and October, Governor 'Vilson made exten-
sive tours through the West, proving to he an excellent campaign
speaker. With poise, self assurance and freedom from personal
invective, he discussed the changed conditions of life in 1912.
He challenged his political opponents saying, "You are willing
to act for the people, "but you are not willing to act through
the people. Now we propose to act for ourselves." In regard
to large corporations, he declared that he was for big business
and against the trusts. "I take my stand absolutely where
every Progressive ought to take his stand on the proposition
that private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable and there
1
will I fight my battle." He attacked the Progressive Party be-'
cause of its acceptance of monopoly; its leader because he dif-
ferentiated between good and bad trusts. By the "New Freedom",
private enterprise was to be liberated from the control of the
trusts. The government was to be restored to the people by
popular election of senators, the initiative, referendum and re-
call of administrative officers.
It was frequently predicted during the campaign that the
Democrats would win a sweeping victory-, and the outcome of the
election justified this view. President Taft carried but two
^ i states, - Vermont and Utah, giving eight electoral votes.
Roosevelt received a total of eighty-eight, from Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Minnesota, South Dakota, V/ashington and a part of
^ -. = =______=__=^
Wilson, Woodrow, The New Freedom , 69
I

California. Wilson carried all the remaining states, with a
total of four hundred thirty-five votes, - the largest majority
any candidate had ever received with the exception of V/ashington
6Uid Monroe. The popular vote for Wilson was 6,285 ,214, v/hich
was smaller than the Bryan vote of 190 8 by 122,892; for Roose-
velt 4,126,020; for Taft 3,483,922. The Democrats also retain-
ed control of the House of Representatives, having a majority
of 291 out of 435 seats. Some of the Republican Old Guard,
Speaker Cannon and William B. McKinley, manager of Taft's pre-
convention campaign, were defeated. In the Senate, the Demo-
crats had fifty, the Republicans forty-four, the Progressives
one, (with one Alabama seat vacant.) The Democrats also elect-
ed twenty-one governors of the thirty-five states in which
chief executives were being chosen: these included New Yorlc,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan
and Nebraska.
Kgtwithstanding the fact that the Progressives lost the
election of 1912, the victory nevertheless lay v/ith progressiv-
ism, as embodied in the Democratic Party. The Republican lead-
ers might have made their party the organization most responsive
to the demands of the voters, but they refused to take warning
by the election of 1910, or to interpret aright the signs of
the times in 1912. The Progressives felt that they had gained
a moral victory, and declared that their leader was really the
choice of the Republican party, because of the large majority
of his votes over Taft's. Thus they would prove that it was
I f
(
I
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the Taft faction rather than Roosevelt who split the party.
They even prophesied that the Republican party would disappear
ani the Progressive v/ould survive. Time was to prove, however,
that the Progressive strength was not real party strength hut
simply a trihute of four millions of people to Roosevelt, he-
cause he was - Roosevelt '.Yithout his leadership the party
was to dissolve aLuost as quickly as it had sprung into exist-
ence.
The foundations for a permanent political organization had
not been laid, partly because the party depended upon one lead-
er and partly because it takes the election of great numbers of
men all over the country to make a party a success. Herein the
Progressives failed, perhaps because there had been so little
time for organization. In only a few places did they have loc-
al and county tickets; even the fight for Congress received in-
adequate attention, because all effort was centered on the
presidency. They did elect nineteen Progressives to Congress,
but the Republicans elected about one hundred. If the Progress-
ive National Committee had seen to it that there was a candi-
date for Congress in every district, it would have increased
party strength greatly,
Roosevelt returned to his home at Oyster Bay feeling that
his public career was ended, for as he expressed his views,
"IrVhen it is evident that a leader's day is past, the one ser-
vice he can render is to step aside and leave the ground clear
for the development of a successor_. It seems to me that such
Is the case now as regards myself,
1
^
Bishop, J,B., Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, 11:355
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Chapter IV
On March 4, 1913, the newly inaugurated President said,
"This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here
muster not the forces of party, "but the forces of humanity.
Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance;
men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do# V/ho shall
live up to the great trust ? ',?ho dares to fail to try?"
Having called Congress to meet in special session on April
7th, he urged thera in person to complete the work of making a
new tariff as soon as possible. Congressman Underwood of
Alabama, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, introduced
a new bill at once, drawn up according to the Democratic plat-
form of 191E. -Vhen the usual swarm of lobbyists appeared, the
President issued such a sharp warning that they were quelled.
With the Democratic control of the House, the bill was passed
May 8th, In the Senate where the Democratic majority numbered
only six there was a longer period of discussion, but the meas-
ure finally received the President's signature October 3rd.
The bill was an attempt to make it easier for the common
man to maintain his family in comfort. Therefore rates were
reduced on clothing, raw materials, agricultural products and
entirely taken off some food stuffs. It was estimated that the
customs receipts would fall off by $38,000,000, the first year,
leaving a deficit of :'568,790,000. To balance the budget a
graduated income tax was included in the bill, having been
0r
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made constitutional a short time before "by the adoption of the
Sixteenth Amendment fPehruary 25, 1912), The Underwood Tariff,
unpopular with some industries, notably the sugar and wool,
satisfied on the whole a popular demand and to some extent
proved that American industry could stand on its own feet.
On June 23rd, while the tariff bill was still under dis-
cussion in the Senate, the President again addressed Congress,
this time on the subject of currency legislation. The princi-
ples which he laid down emphasized the need of a more elastic
currency, some means of mobilizing bank reserves, and public
control of the banking system. Based upon extensive banking
investigations which had already been made by experts in pre-
vious years. Senator Owen and Carter Glass, Chairman of the
Senate and House Committees on Banking and Currency, drafted
the Federal Reserve Bill. After extended discussion the House
passed the measure on December 22nd with thirty-four Republi-
cans, eleven Progressives and one Independent voting with the
Democrats, It received favorable consideration in the Senate
and was signed by the President before the expiration of the
year 1913.
President Wilson, with unusual powers of leadership and
unruffled tenacity of purpose, turned to the next tremendous
undertaking, - the regulation of trusts, as a result of his
recommendations, a Federal Trade Commission was established
(September 26, 1.914) which should supersede the Bureau of Cor-
porations created in 1903. The five members were to prevent
01
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the use of unfair methods "by corporations which were suhject to
I
the anti-trust laws, and were empowered to issue an order re-
quiring the cessation of any oTd j ectionahle practises which were
discovered. If the order was not o^beyed, the Commission had re4
j
course to the circuit court of appeals. They were also to in-
vestigate the management of large industrial corporations.
The Clayton Anti-Trust Act (Octoher 15th 1914) prohibited
:
many of the practises common to industrial enterprises, such as
interlocking directorates and price discriminations to lessen
competition. A most significant feature of this act is the re-
i
cognition of the demands of organized lahor. It sustains the
!
view point of labor leaders "by declaring that the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce, Tnjunc-
I
tions are not to be granted in labor disputes unless necessary
I
to prevent irreparable injury, and trials for contempt of court
are to be by jury (except when the offense was committed in the
presence of the court,) Strikes, picketing and boycotting are
not violations of ar^ federal law. Labor and agricultural or-
ganizations (not for profit) are declared not to be conspiracies
j
in restraint of trade.
Such was the record of the first year and a half of Presi-
dent Wilson's administration. The progressive character of the
legislation in fulfilment of the campaign promises tremendously
increased the President's prestige. The full significance of
his success was apparent in the mid term Congressional elections
I
of 1914 when the Progressives found that he had "stolen most of
• th-air thunder" and left thea no vninftrAbl^ p^int of ^^ttftftk.
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Chapter 7
With such a record of constructive achievement as the
Democrats had made, it is not strange that the Repuhlican Party
tegan to consider how they might regain the esteem of progress-
ive-minded people and win hack the millions of votes whom they
had lost. Some believed that only a complete reorganization of
the party would be effectual, while even the most conservative
admitted that large concessions would have to be made. At an
informal conference of representatives from eleven states, held
at Chicago May 11, 1913 recommendations were made to the ITation^
al Committee that a special national convention be held to con-
sider the advisability of changing the basis of representation
in future conventions.
Accordingly the National Committee met in V/ashington
December 16, 1913 and formulated a new plan of reapportionment
of delegates whereby each state was to have four delegates at
large, one from each Congressional district and one additional
delegate from each district in which the Republican vote for
presidential electors in 1908 was over 7,500, This revision
would reduce the excessive representation of Southern States,
but not commensurat ely with the actual voting strength of Repub-|
licans in those states. Thus by this mild reconstruction of coi|-
vention machinery, the Republican party made a gesture of con-
ciliation to the Progressives, The Progressives did not seem
greatly impressed, however, and declared that they intended to
remain with the new party.
Ogg, Frederic A,, National Progress
.
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Chapter VI
The Progressive Party, in the meantime, encouraged by
their remarkable success in polling more than four million
Totes began making aggressive efforts to strengthen their party
organization. The National Committee instructed its secretary,
Mr, Oscar Davis, to open offices in Washington, and furnish a
special news service from there to the several hundred Progress-
ive newspapers in various parts of the country. These were
sufficient in number, both large and small, to maintain con-
stant publicity. Local conmittees were at work making prepar-
iitions to get Progressives into country and municipal offices,
and everyv/here there was an attitude of confidence in the fut-
ure of the party and its probability of success in another elec-
tion.
So absorbed were most of the leaders in their plans that
they failed to perceive at first that Roosevelt was not really
happy in the continued leadership of the party. Apparently
disheartened, after the elections he had retired to Oyster Bay
where he seemed to prefer to remain in seclusion. Aside from
a few brillifiuit statesmen, journalists, and social workers, he
found little in the party associations to appeal to him. Fur-
thermore dissensions among the leaders, - always the curse of
reform movements - were already beginning to appear.
The first evidence of this party strife appeared in the
convention which was called to meet in Chicago in December (1913
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to consnlt with Roosevelt, but so sharp were the dissensions
that it narrowly escaped ending in open rupture. Some of the
leaders, especially Amos Pinchot, were planning to launch a
movement there to drop Mr, George Perkins from his position
as Chairman of the Executive Committee. Roosevelt was incensed
and refused to discuss the matter with Pinchot. Although no ac-|
tion was taken at this time, the effort to remove Perkins con-
tinued unabated as long as the party existed.
After the Wilson administration brought suit against the
International Harvester Company, Amos Pinchot renewed the fight
"by a letter to Senator Dixon, (Chairman of the Speakers* Bureau
of the Progressive Party) demanding that LIr. Perkins give up
his office. Roosevelt and Beve ridge warmly defended the pro-
gressivism of Ur, Pericins, while other party leaders like
Gifford Pinchot, Lledill :.:cCormic Senator Dixon, Hiram Johnson,
and Hayroond Robins felt that his connection v/ith the party was
an actual detriment. The latter was convinced that a million
working men never v/ould join a party whose executive head v/as
also the head of two corporations (International Harvester
Company and United States Steel Corporation), the labor policy
of which v/as anti-union. Strongly and vigorously did Beveridge
convincingly vindicate Mr. Perkins. Because of the personal
feelings of Roosevelt and Beveridge, llr, Perkins continued to
serve as Chairman of the ITational Executive Conmittee, but with
1
increasing danger to party solidarity.
The next rift in the leadership of the party was apparent
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among the Progressives who had heen elected to the House of
Hepresentatives . The little group of nineteen had heen joined
"by Victor Murdock, of Kansas, who had been elected as a Repuh-
lican. He had served several terms in Congress and was a mem-
"ber of the Committee on '.Vays and Lleans, which would he respon-
sihle for drawing up the new tariff hill in the special session
called hy President Wilson.
Mr. Underwood, Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
was already holding hearings on the tariff and malking prepar-
ations to draw up the hill. I'uoh. of this worlc v;as done in sec-
ret. This same method had called forth complaints ahout the
Payne Aldrich measure. What should be the attitude of the nine-
teen Progressives? Obviously their votes could not in any way
affect the passage of the bill, consequently there remained but
one way to register protest on its provisions. If instead of
TOting by the usual "Aye" or "ITo", each one should vote "Pres-
ent", explaining as he did so, that he votes in this way because
of the total lack of information as to why the rates fixed by
the committee had been adopted, and because of the secrecy sur-
rounding the malting of the bill, it might make an effective
protest which would arouse the country.
A meeting of the Progressives in the House was arranged,
and it was explained to them how such a procedure on their part
might impress upon the whole country the Progressive point of
view. Senator Beveridge was present, and told in detail of the
fight made by the insurgents in the Seimte against the Payne-
XLdrich Tariff. Wow the nrrortnnlty was given them to register^.

by this method of voting their protest against the Underwood
Bill. But these suggestions were met with a veritable storm of
protest. These Progressives were not going to be influenced by
the dictation of "Bosses" or any such political practises: they
intended to vote as free representatives of the people. Thus
with no conception of party solidarity, they voted all three
ways on the bill some for it, some against it, and one voted
1
"Present,"
The National Committee (of the Progressive Party) made one
more effort to make the group of Progressive Congressmen instruf
mental in centering the attention of the country upon the^meth-
ods used in tariff making.
The usual procedure for a tariff measure through the House
is as follows: For several days there is a period of general
debate, when the members make speeches which are designed es-
pecially for "home consumption" among their constituency. After
that the bill is taken up in the Committee of the V/hole, where
It is read line by line, under the five-minute rule. Each mem-
ber of the Committee on Ways and Means has five minutes, if he
so desires, on any point that is questioned. Any member of the
House has the right to move an amendment, which gives him five
minutes to discuss it. One member may then be given five min-
utes to oppose the amendment, '^en this time has been used, it
is possible to obtain more time only by unanimous consent.
The second plan of the Progressive National Committee was
to attack the Underwood Bill, under the five minute rule, v/ith
75
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the demand for information as to why rates had heen fixed at
the figures adopted hy the committee. If this were icept up
long enough, it would attract the attention of the House and
the country at large. This, the Progressives hoped, would make
it apparent that the rates were fixed arbitrarily or in accord-
ance with statements made by some interested person.
The procedure to he followed was identical for each item
that carried a duty. After the clerk read the first item, one
of the Progressives was to move an amendment by which he would
obtain the floor. Then he was to ask the committee member in
charge of that particular schedule what information the committ
ee had which led it to fix that particular rate. Mr. Murdock,
the Progressive floor leader, began the attack when the item
concerning boracic acid had been read, by asking for this in-
formation. (As a matter of fact, the rate had been reduced fra
three cents a pound in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff to three-quar-
ters of a cent.) Representative Francis Harrison of New York
who was in charge of this schedule was caught unawares, for a
chemical expert had fixed this rate, and he could not very well
be summoned to explain it. So Mr. Harrison had to spend his
1
five minutes in "stalling."
Mr. Murdoch sat down with a smile of satisfaction and neveir
asked the question again about any other item, nor did any other
Progressive attempt to carry on the plan. After this, the
National Committee made no further suggestions to the Progress-
ive Congressmen, who went their own way, most of them to their
_ ^ __
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political graves in the next election. This total disregard
for the importance of team work made it evident that the Pro-
gressive Party was doomed to early extinction. One of the
Committee aptly described the situation, v/hen he said, "Sheep
respond to leadership hut goats do not. A flock of sheep,
called or frightened, v/ill run all in a bunch. But under simi-
lar circumstances a flock of goats will run just about as many
ways as there are goats."
An even greater threat to party unity was the persistent
rumor that the Progressives were going to return to the Repub-
lican fold. Llr, Frank Munsey had broached the subject first to
Beveridge shortly after the election of 1912, but was so quick-
ly silenced that he dropped the matter temporarily. In Febru-
ary 1912, however, he wrote as follows:
"I am especially anxious that you should open up to a re-
ceptive riev} of this scheme and get busy with me in helping to
bring it about, We have got to get together the people who
think alike, have got to get them together as a fighting force
to go into the field against our common enemy, the Democratic
party.
"You have had years of experience in statesmanship and I
have had years of experience in business. The business side of
politics is a very important one. It takes money to organize
and maintain a political organization and to maintain a fight-
ing force in the field.
"There is no considerable money in the Progressive party.
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save in the pockets of a very few, and the very fm will not
feel called upon to fight another campaign alone. We need the
Republican voters and they need us. We need their money and
1
they need our idealism,"
Beveridge, realizing how dangerous such views v/ere to the
future of the Progressive Party, wrote a spirited challenge in
the Saturday Evening Post of June 2 8th 1913. He asked how it
was possible for Progressives and Republicans to merge when a
million Democrats voted the Progressive ticket and a million
Republicans voted the Democratic ticket. 'How merge Cannon and
LaPollette, Penrose and Cummins, Parker of Louisiana, and Harri !
of Georgia with Root of New York and Smoot of Utah? And what
terms did those Progressives who hoped for union expect to get?
And why should the Progressives adopt a defeated attitude since
they had polled more votes than the Republicans? The new party
was also doing more organization work than both the old parties
combined. It was being built from the ground up. Over five
thousand party clubs had been organized in 1913, and in 1914
they would nominate straight out Progressives for candidates
I
for United States senators. Did Republicans and Democrats stand
for the same thing? Absurd! They differed on trust regulation,
on the initiative, referendum and recall, on the idea that
labor was a ccanmodity. And child labor, too. How could the
Progressive party with this conception of nationalism as one ol
its basic principles, be merged with another party that denied
that principle? Would the Republican party put a child -labor
1
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plank in its platform?'
A fev/ days after this magazine article appeared Beveridge
received a letter from Roosevelt expressing the hope that he
would assist the Progressives in Uaine in their campaign for
the September elections, because of the *real importance to the
future of the Progressive party in New England.* Roosevelt
himself had been travelling through the west and on his return
had given an interview which the Republican newspapers inter-
preted to mean that he would consider bargaining with the Repub-
licans for a return. Beveridge felt that he should have met
this challenge v;ith a positive denial. He asked the Colonel,
therefore, before starting for Maine, for permission to deny
publicly such an interpretation. Roosevelt wrote in reply:
(September 12, 1913) "I have for a year and a half been explain-
ing to the Republicans just how they can get together with us -
that is, by adopting our platform in its entirety, by retiring
their own leaders of the Root, Penrose, Barnes, Smoot variety -
and then I am afraid we should have to insist upon their chang-
ing their name, not that to me personally names mean anything,
1
but because they do mean so much to many people."
Beveridge still felt, however, that Roosevelt himself
should issue a positive denial, and wrote him to that effect.
Roosevelt did issue a denial, (September 9, 1913) but it was
far from satisfactory, Beveridge attacked the TTational Commit-
tee for its failure also to deny the rumors that Roosevelt want-
ed to go back to the Republican party and was planning to get
1
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the Republican nomination in 1916, He wrote them fSeptemher 10,
1913), "Our people hardly know that to think. The one thing we
cannot aJid must not permit is anjr suspicion of our political
and moral integrity, or that of our great leader," »;vhat did
Ormshy LTcHarg mean "by his Detroit statement that Roosevelt was
really conservative at heart ani would he the Repuhlican nomin-
ee in 1916? Such comments from one associated with the Roose-
velt fight in 1912 were destructive.'
Two months after Beveridge*s complaint to the National
Committee, the leaders of the Progressive party assembled for
a conference in Indianapolis, '.Vhen Sever idge asked them if
they wished to merge with the Republicans, there was an empha-
tic shout of "No," There was not the slightest possibility of
misunderstanding their position in this matter. The rumors,
however, persisted, not without some basis of support. An or-
ganizer employed by the National Committee for work in South
Dakota was telling the Progressives in that state that a merger
with the Republicans would be all right,
Beveridge next turned to the National Chairman Perking
with protests and warnings of the difficulty of doing aggress-
ive field work in organization while the very foundations of
the party structure v/ere being thus undermined. Here again he
met with no satisfaction, for Perkins treated the matter joking-
ly, Beveridge then wrote Medill McCormick urging that the
Chicago Tribune make it clear that "under no circumstances or
conditions shall there by any merger, amalgamation or connection

of any tind with any other party whatever. The sincerity and
1
integrity of the Progressive party was at state,"
Throughout the year 1913 Beveridge v/as not only persistent-
ly comhating this propaganda, hut he was travelling extensively
over the country, strengthening the party organization. He was
everjrwhere in great demand as a speaker, and he responded as
far as it was possihle, for he was very much in earnest ahout
the new party with its ideals of social and political reform.
In January he addressed a Northwestern Progressive Conference
in St. Paul, where he endeavored to show the Republicans that
that party had finished its mission just as the Whig party had
finished its mission when the Republican party v/as formed, A
month later he delivered in Burlington, Vermont a speech descrih
ed as "one of the greatest ever given on economics and the in-
2
dustrial situation in Few England," When Governor Hadley of
Missouri gave up Progressivism, Beveridge replied in an address
in Detroit, As a means of building up the Progressive party in
the south, he delivered a masterly address at !Tew Orleans cover-
ing the program of the Progressives on the tariff, the trusts,
the initiative and referendum. In comparison with the strenu-
ous activity of Beveridge throughout the year 1913, the silence
of Roosevelt was the more conspicuous, l^oreover Beveridge was
engaged at the time in literary work, seeking to satisf^^ an ara-
"bition he had cherished since his early youth, of writing a
life of Chief Justice IJarshall. 'Vhen, therefore, Perkins sought
to send Beveridge to '.Vest Virginia, he finally rebelled, "Why
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shouldnH Roosevelt go? It would be his last opportunity for
a "bugle "blast "before leaving for South America." ;vhy not in-
deed? There was hut one answer possible: - Roosevelt had lost
interest in the party he had helped to create.
The year following the famous election of 1912 was, as we
have seen, marked by dissensions within the Progressive party,
lack of team work among its members in Congress, rumors of
amalgamation with the Republican party and a silent indiffer-
ence on the part of its great leader. I'ore threatening still
to the i^rty was the remarkable success with which the Democrats
were carrying out their policies, some of which v/ere identical
with parts of the Progressive platform. The tariff bill was
such an improvement over former ones that even LaFollette had
voted for it and the currency measure was advancing by satis-
factory stages. President V/ilson was proving himself a skilful
and courageous party leader, and the Democrats were giving him
loyal support. All this was making a favorable impression on
the country.
In the fall of 1913 Roosevelt was preparing to sail for
South America on a hunting and exploring expedition. The Pro-
gressives tendered him a farev/ell dinner where many expected he
would take advantage of the opportunity to "sound a militant
battle-cry to rally the wavering columns of the Progressives."
Mr. Perkins wrote Beveridge that "the Colonel is going to speak
in a ver:7 broad way at the dinner and I am heartily in favor of
1
it." Beveridge replied immediately, "I do not agree with you
1
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a"bout the theme of the Colonel* s speech. If ever there was a
time when the whole situation demands from him a hattle cry
that will sound from ocean to ocean and which will reassure
those who have rallied to his colors, that tim.e is the present."
But there was no hattle cry and the Colonel sailed for South
l^merica, leaving the Progressive party to worry along as hest
I
it could during his ahsence from the country (Octoher 4, 1913 -
May 19, 1914.)
tfhen Roosevelt returned from South iUnerica, still suffer-
ing from the effects of the illness which had nearly ended his
life there, he was reluctant to resume the leadership of the
Progressive party. He would have preferred to keep out of the
campaign of 1914 completely hut this scarcely seemed possible.
In several of the states, the most prominent Progressive leaders
were candidates for office. In Indiana, Beveridge was again a
candidate for United States Senator, as was Johnson in Californ-
lia, and James H. Garfield m Ohio. Gifford Pinchot was waging
a brilliant fight for the Senate against Penrose in Pennsylvan-
ia. In Kansas, Bristow was runninr for re-election on the
Republican ticket, opposed by Victor Murdock:, the Progressive
nominee. The success of these prominent Progressive candidates
would be a real index of the strength of the party and would
inevitably have a real si,^nif icance for its future. These men
had been among the Colonel's most earnest supporters in 1912,
and he felt that he ov/ed them a debt of gratitude which could
I
only be repaid by rendering to them similar assistance at this
t•
» (
1 L
time. He did, however, refuse the request of the party that
he enter the race as candidate for governor of Hew York, for he
had already decided to give his support to Ur* Harvey Hinman.
The Progressives who had made a good showing in ITew York
state in the election of Iyi2 thought that they had a fair
chance of success in 1914, especially since there had been an
open rupture among the Democrats following the impeachment of
their Governor Sulzer, The Republicans also were alert to the
possibilities of the situation. V.x » Hinman was regarded as a
Republican, but he had been a steady supporter of Roosevelt up
to the split in 1912, and the Colonel believed he would make an
excellent governor. So Roosevelt began to sound out Progress-
ive opinion as to placing Hinman's name in the primaries as
their candidate. Although this proposition was not very well
received, it might have been carried out, had it not been
doubtful whether Hinman could get the Republican nomination
also, What would be his attitude if he won the Progressive
but lost the Republican nomination? Would he go through the
campaign as a Progressive or would he drop out of the race al-
together? In order to ascertain this, Roosevelt sent the
Secretary of the Progressive TTational Committee, i:r, Oscar K.
Davis, to interview LIr • Hinman personally. The latter finally
admitted that he would not run on the Progressive ticket, if
the Republicans refused to place him in nomination in their
1
primaries. It was manifestly impossible then for Roosevelt to
carry out his plan.
1
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When the news of these secret negotiations finally lea"ked
out, the Progressives were astounded. For the founder and he-
loved leader of their party to place in nomination a candidate
who v;as an avowed Hepuhlican, could have hut the one meaning -
Roosevelt was getting ready to leave his followers and return
to the Republican partyj The 'Hinman deal^ was the first step
in that direction. All these persistent rumors were not with-
out foundation, then, - he had intended all along to go haclc.
The argument that the reform forces of both Republicans and
Progressives should unite against the political machines of
these two parties was illogical since it did not include the
Democrats at all. The Progressives who were in the party for
personal advantage promptly deserted and hastened to join the
Republicans again.
The Republicans of New York state haughtily dismissed
Roosevelt's suggestion for a fusion candidate, and as a result
he announced that "of course he would support the Progressive
ticfcet." But the Progressives entered the campaign humiliated
by such overtures to the Republican party. The Progressive
State Convention finally nominated for governor, Frederick M.
Davenport, who accepted on condition that Roosevelt should cam-
paign the state for him. After giving this promise, Roosevelt
toured the state with him, in an automobile, speaking at cross-
roads and country towns, and "working very much as if he were a
1
candidate for township supervisor," For a man of Colonel
Roosevelt's caliber and prestige, it seemed a waste of his
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splendid powers. In spite of these heroic endeavors, Davenport
later suffered a humiliating defeat. The Progressive party was
approaching its end.
V/hen the news of the "Hinman deal" first reached Beveridge,
he was touring the state of Illinois for Robins. With Medill
McCormick and other Illinois leaders, he was receiving a most
enthusiastic welcome everywhere. The effect of the news from
New Yorit was disheartening. "From that hour on," he wrote
later, "the local committees on the Illinois tour who met the
train looked like men who had heen stricken with illness."
Beveridge v/as very angry and wrote Perkins: "I am very,
Tery sorry that the Colonel's statement ahout Hinman and the
ITew York situation made an exceedingly unfavorable impression
on our workers in Illinois, and, I fear, on the general public.
There is some danger that it may stop scores and hundreds of
thousands of Republicans from coming over to us, who are ready
to come and sinxious to come, provided they think that the Pro-
gressive Party is here to stay The Colonel's statement may
give this important class an unfavorable opinion on this sub-
ject . So it is not very nice, is it, after all the work we
have done out here in Indiana - yes, Illinois and Ohio too —
and the sacrifices we have made, to have this bombshell thrown
into us? The Republican papers and politicans, and the
'Indianapolis News' are making the most of it. They are orint-
1
ing columns about T.R.'s abandonment of the Progressive Party."
'.Vherever Beveridge travelled thereafter in Indiana, he
Was confronted by huge bill board advertisements of the
1
Bowers, C.G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era. 451,452
86
•<
f
f
•
1
0 , . .
1
I
1
1 I
1
* • >
t
r
87
iRepulDlicans : 'Eventually, why not now?' With the handicap of
llRoosevelt' s attempted merger of the Progressives with the
Repuhlicans , his own struggle for the senatorship of Indiana
"became more difficult and his correspondence with Perkins "be-
came increasingly more bitter. ".Vhen the latter asked him to
make speeches in Maine, he refused. "We have got to win the
Indiana fight and are going to win it", he wrote. "The Nev/ York
performance has made our worli harder, but not impossible •
I shall expect Colonel Roosevelt, in order to make up in a very
small way for the large handicap his action has placed upon me
jout here, to assist in the campaign by the delivery of a few
ispeeches in my behalf." In New York, Roosevelt had said to
Shaffer, "if we can elect Beveridge in Indiana, we can nominate
him for the presidency in 1916." In preparation for these
jj
jspeeches he had v/ritten Beveridge asking for a complete record
iof his public work. But his actual efforts amounted to only
one-half a day in Indiana, two in Ohio, three in Illinois and
one week in Pennsylvania. (Here two of his intimate friends
were running for office, - Gifford Pinchot for United States
Senator and William Draper Lewis for Governor.)
Nevertheless wherever Roosevelt did Journey, he was greet-
ed with the same old time enthusiasm, but he knew perfectly
well that this was only for him and not at all for those for
whom he was asking the crowds to vote. Yet motivated by a de-
sire to discharge all political obligations to his friends, he
went through the entire campaign, receiving the applause of the
r ^
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Tast audiences, always cheerful, always with his head high, and
with all his old time appearance of confidence and hopefulness,
while inwardly he saw the utter futility of it all. A fev; of
the leaders at Progressive headquarters, realizing the accuracy
of his judgment, "begged him to stop the wear is o me campaigning,
hut he kept on persistently, for v/hether or not Beveridge and
other friends looked upon his labors in the same light that he
did, Roosevelt at least felt that he was obviating all obliga-
tions. Finally on the last campaign trip, as he was nearing
New York on the way to Sagamore, in the company of Secretary
I
O.K. Davis, he leaned over and whacked Davis on the knee, say-
ing as he did so: "Well, O.K., IWe got only a few hours more
of this campaign, and then I shall be through. I'll be out of
politics then for good and all and 1*11 be a free man. I shall
have paid every political obligation that I owe to anybody any-
where. I have done a great deal uf foolish and useless work
this fall, but after all, it has been worth while from one
point of view. It has paid all my debts. Hereafter no man can
Claim anything from me in politics. TTot a single obligation
is left. I have done everything, this fall, that everybody
has wanted. This election makes me an absolutely free man.
1
Thereafter I am going to say and do Just what I damn please,"
1
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Chapter VII
The results of the election of 1914 showed a slight victory
for the Democrats, They managed to carry a numher of former
jRepuDlican states, such as Ilassachusetts
,
Michigan, and
Nehraska, and to increase their majority in the Senate by two,
^ut their House majority fell from 147 to only 2 9, They were
saved from disaster only because the opposition was still div-
ided. The Democratic loss resulted in benefit to the Republi-
cans chiefly, for they carried many of their former strongholds,
and also Uew York.. The total Progressive vote fell from over
!4, 000, 000 to about 1,800,000, less than half that xn 1912, Their
irepresentation in the House was reduced from fifteen to seven
[Lembers, The party failed to carry a tsingle state except Calif-
'ornia, where Hiram Johnson was re-elected by a plurality of
13 0,000, Though a xarge vote was also polled in Pennsylvania,
ithe results of the election, taken as a whole, showed that the
Progressive Party w«a doomed. One of the TTational Committee,
referring to its decease, wrote; "The Progressive Party died,
ntestate, with the campaign of 1914, It had little or nothing
to devise, practically all of its assets having been appropri-
ated, during its brief life time, by one or the other or both
1
of the old parties," Some of the newspapers also began writing
symipathetic obituaries of the party, even extending their re-
parks to include the political career of the founder of the
Iparty, Roosevelt's own comment on the election expressed his
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belief that "the Progressive party cannot in all probability
make another fight as a national party; and, if it does, there
1
will be no expectation that I will have to lead."
The disaster to the Progressive Party v/as due to a variety
of causes, - among which may be mentioned the dissensions with-
in the party and the return of many of its follov;ers to the
Republican fold. Others, attracted by the record of Democratic
achievements, supported President Wilson because they were con-
yinced that the Progressive party was gradually fading away.
The radical proposals of the Progressives may have been less
favorably received than previously, because the country was in
a more cautious mood. The outbrealc of war in Europe in August
had alarmed mar^r in the United States and had made them fearful
of ar^ change whatsoever. They had lost their "desire for in-
novation and experimentation because a large part of the world
had burst into flames and the remaining part was thinking of
its fire-extinguishers,"
The shrinkage of Democratic votes from 1912 to 1914 was
probably due to the traditional custom of holding the party in
power responsible for business conditions. During the winter
of 1912-14, an industrial depression was settling down on the
country: business was dull in many lines and an increasing num-
ber of men were out of work. During the spring and summer con-
ditions grew slightly worse. Political opponents of the ad-
ministration were not slow in attributing the hard times to the
Democratic tariff and general Democratic incompetence.
1
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Immediately after the election, Ilr . George 7/. Perkins
called a conference of Progressive leaders at Chicago (1914).
He had not thought it wise to nave Roosevelt present and had
written Beveridge to that effect. A blunt and decisive answer
was received, asking why the founder and leader of the party
should not attend the conference when the very life of the
party was at stake. In the hour of defeat, leadership was more
indispensable to the troops than in the flush of victory. If
ever there was a time for Roosevelt to rise above any height to
which he had previously risen, that was the hour. The rank and
file of the party and the local county and district leaders ex-
1
pected and depended on a sturdy and aggressive leadership. But
Roosevelt did not attend, and Beveridge had departed for Europe
as war correspondent for Collier's Weekly.
There were, however, ninety -one representatives from thirig'
four different states in attendance. They issued a statement
vigorously denying the demise of the Progressive party and de-
nouncing their intention of keeping up their organization and
campaign of education v/ith the view of being a serious factor
in the election of 1916. The unanimous opinion was that there
could be no reconciliation with the Republican party under any
circumstances. Almost everybody was for a renewal of the fight
all along the line,
newspaper comments varied according to their friendliness
to the Progressive movement but some admitted that the party
was still alive and might yet become a force to be reckoned
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with, A nav party could not expect to win immediately and
their million and a quarter votes might malLe them a decisive
factor in 1916, liven if the separate party organization v/as
not continued, their support of President V/ilson would insure
Ihim of a second term while if the Republicans should nominate
a superior candidate, he might get the bulk of the Progressive
vote. So conjecture at the close of 1914 ranged all the way
from the expectation of an increase in party strength to the
prophesy of party dissolution, with the votes going either to
the Republicans or to the Democratic administration.
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Chapter VIII
One factor which was to prove a decisive influence in the
next presidential election was just beginning to loom large
upon the political horizon at this time. This was the war in
Europe, Although the people of the United States were shocked
"by the ruthless invasion of Belgium, yet no voice of protest
was raised in this country in August 1914, and apparently there
was no expectation of intervention "by the United States among
the Allies, Ambassador Page, who himself a few months later
Insisted that the United States ought to sever relations with
Sermany, wrote to Colonel House from London on August 26th,
1914, of the gain to United States in being able to escape the
brutalization of war, and Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British
Ambassador to the United States, told House on September 12, "I
hope and believe that at any rate one part of the world will
1
keep out of it."
Even as the German armies were pressing toward Paris
through Belgium, President '.Vilson issued his Proclamation of
Neutrality (August 4th)
,
and two weeks later asV.ed his fellow
countrymen to be "impartial in thought as well as in action,"
This insistence upon strict neutrality and the maintenance of
peace was entirely consistent with his character and his poli-
cies for the government, as well as with the lav/ of nations.
He was by nature a real pacifist and believed that war was not
only debasing morally but disastrous economically. Perhaps
"'
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there v/as also a constitutional tendency to postpone a decision
upon a question in which he saw a "balance of opposing arguments.
With his scholarly temperament he set the good over against the
evil so carefully and theoretically that it was hard to deter-
mine upon a course of positive action, and so he delayed an un-
pleasant decision, hoping that something might "turn up."
Furthermore he had entered office with a certain program of
social reform in view, and until this was completed, it v/as
essential that there "be an atmosphere of domestic tranquillity.
President '.Vilson toofc the position that it was better to
"reserve judgment until the end of the war, v/hen all its events
and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their
1
true relations," He urged his fellow countrymen not to be
throv/n off their balance by a war with which they had nothing
to do and whose causes could not touch the United States, He
felt that it might afford the United States an opportunity for
disinterested service. Undoubtedly he looked forward to acting
as mediator in the struggle just as Roosevelt had done between
Bussia and Japan.
In 1915, President Wilson hegan first to be criticized
harshly for not having adopted a more positive policy as a sig-
natory to the Hague Convention, His critics said that the
United States should have protested against the Grorman invasion
of Belgium and the President should have made it plain that
this country sympathized with the Allies, But such criticism
at a later time disregards altogether the fact that public
- — _
—
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opinion v/as not then crystallized to this degree, and express-
ions of ssrmpathy were contrary to neutrality and inconsistent
unless they were to be supported by action. Few people in the
entire country believed then that the United States would ever
enter the war. So the President's proclamation of neutrality
was generally accepted as right, and occasioned no real comment.
The attitude of Roosevelt, who later became one of the most
determined advocates of American intervention on the side of
the Entente, was that of loyal support of the President in his
policy of neutrality. He congratulated the country on its
separation from European quarrels, and emphasized the value of
the Monroe Doctrine, Apparently he did not condemn publicly
the invasion of Belgium, for in the Outloofc of August 22nd 1914,
he said, "I am not nov/ taking sides one way or the other as
concerns the violation or disregard of those treaties. "7hen
giants are engaged in a death wrestle, as they reel to and fro
they are certain to trample on whoever gets in the way of
either of the huge straining combatants."
When the Belgium Commission visited the United States a
month later, Roosevelt wrote that the invasion had been inevit-
able because "disaster would surely have attended her (German)
arms had she not followed the course which she actually did
follov/ as regards her opponents on her V/estern frontier." There
could be "nothing but praise due a stern, virile, and masterful
people, a people entitled to hearty respect for their patriot-
ism &i3d. far-seeing devotion." This was the voice of the
rr
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militarist in Roosevelt which had spoken, not the idealist and
moralist. He said that Germany admitted that as "a matter of
abstract right and wrong" the invasion of .Belgium could not be
justified, hut "when a great nation is struggling for its exist
ence," there was "no such thing as abstract right and wrong."
Hoosevelt^s comment on such reasoning was an admission that
"almost all great nations have - again and again acted in ac-
1
cordance with such a plea,"
Thus did Roosevelt seem to condone not only the invasion
of Belgium on the ground of military necessity, but he also re-
fused to pass judgment on the Antwerp air raids or the destruc-
tion of Louvain, Was he then pro-German in the early stages of
the war? Some of his critics have maintained that he was,
pointing to an article in the Outlook of September 23rd in
which he referred with pride to the German blood in his veins,
and asserted that either side in the war could be defended.
While expressing sympathy for Belgium he felt that, *we had not
the slightest responsibility for what had befallen her, and
probably nothing that we could have done would have helped her.
Our first duty was to protect our own interests, and maintain
our neutrality by refusing to do anything to aid unoffending,
weak powers which were dragged into the gulf of bloodshed and
misery through no fault of their own.*
Some of these articles, Roosevelt later regretted and
altered before he permitted their publication in final form.
His change in point of view was probably typical of large
1
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numbers of other Americans who were at first indifferent as to
the outcome hut in the course of a few months hecame ardent
opponents of Germany. Two of his biographers, Ur, Joseph
Bishop and '.Villiam Draper Lewis resent the insinuation that
Roosevelt was favorable to Germany in the first fev/ months of
the war. The latter asserts that the Colonel was anxious to do
nothing which would in any way embarrass the President so he
wrote only a part of what was m his mind. In conference with
the other editors of the Outlook, however, he voiced his belief
that the United States should have protested the invasion of
Belgium because of the fact that it was in contravention of the
1
Hague Treaty, LIr, Lawrence F. Abbott, one of the editors of
the Outlook, vouches for this testimony. At the Republican
State Convention in ITew York City a year and a half later,
Elihu Root took occasion to criticize the President because he
did not send a stern protest to Germany when Belgium was first
invaded. At the Democratic Convention a fev/ days later, er-
Governor Glynn retaliated by attacking Roosevelt who had become
the chief Republican critic of the Administration. Glynn pro-
duced the Outlook of September 23, 1914, and read extracts from
Roosevelt^s article, seeking to prove that obviously Roosevelt
himself had not favored the idea of protesting against the in-
yasion of Belgium.
His official biographer. Bishop, believes that Roosevelt^s
private letters were more truly representative of his opinion
than was the article in the Outlook, But many of these letters
Lewis, T^illiam D., The Life of Theodore Roosevelt^ 459-460,

have not been made public. The correspondence with Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge ceases on May 23, 1914, and is not resumed
1
again until December 7, 1914. The first letter after the war
began, which Bishop publishes is dated October 3, 1914 and was
written to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador in V/ashing-
ton. In it Roosevelt stated that if he had been President, he
should have acted on the thirtieth or thirty-first of July fv;ar
was declared July 28th) as head of a signatory power of The
Hague Treaties. He would have called attention to the guarantee
of Belgium's neutrality and stated that the treaties imposed a
serious obligation which he expected not only the United States
but all other neutral nations to join in enforcing. He v/ould
not have made such a statement unless he had been willing to
back it up and he believed the American people would have fol-
lowed him. As it was, he felt certain that the majority were
then following '.Yilson, for in such a crisis few people make up
their minds for themselves but tend, or ought to tend, to sup-
oC
port the President.
Two days later (October 5, 1914) Roosevelt wrote Baldwin
in London that in his opinion in regard to Belgium "all the
right was on her side and all the wrong was committed against
her." He felt that England could not have done other than she
did, in interfering for her. Another personal letter on
November 8, 1914 (to Charles McCarthy, Madison, Wisconsin) ex-
pressed his admiration for the men of German descent in the
United States but added that if the United States really
1
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"beliered in world righteousness, then it was inexcusable for her
1
Slot to protest against Germany's action in regard to Belgium,
Thus from these private letters of Roosevelt's, it is appaif"
ent that he was reversing his policy of strict neutrality or
partial defense of Germany to one of partisanship for the
Allies. He gave no public expression to this however, until
the early part of the year 1915, for as he wrote Rudyard Kiplin
(January 16, 1915) he did not like to bother the men who were
at the helm so he kept silent as long as he thought there was
any chance that VITilson v/as really developing a worthy policy.
But when he came to the conclusion that the President really
had no policy whatever, he felt that someone should speak frank-
ly to his fellow countrymen and that he was endeavoring to do.
By February 1915 he was "sick at heart over the actions of
Wilson and Bryan." That month Germany announced her submarine
policy.
Now to what is Roosevelt's changing viewpoint to be attri-
buted? A gradual change in public opinion was taking place and
it was apparent that complete neutrality could be only a tempo-
rary condition. The increasing concern in the war was due to a
variety of causes. England, ^'rance and Russia published selec-
tions from the diplomatic correspondence which had taken place
with Germany and Austria during the interval between the murder
of the Archduke of Austria (June 28th) and the declaration of
war by Austria on Servia (July28th). The main point of these
documents, garbled though they may be, centered on the efforts
to bring,ab.Qut a conciliatioji^betweeii^Aust r i a a^rifi sjrvia^ wh 1 nin
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had "been frustrated by a determination on the part of the
Teutonic pavers to have war. LTany in the United States who
read these accounts drew the conclusion that Germany could have
restrained Austria hut chose not to do so. To such, Germany
then hecame the brutal aggressor and the perpetrator of horrible
atrocities which were described in the daily newspapers. The
resulting change in public opinion is reflected in the change
which had taken place in Roosevelt's point of view also.
A second influence which increased his partiality for the
cause of the Allies was his growing dislike for V/oodrow Wilson»
How long this had been smoldering before it burst into flame is
difficult to decide. It probably began after his return from
South America, in May 1914, v/hen he learned of the treaty which
Secretary of State Bryan was negotiating with Colombia whereby
the United States was to apologize for its part in the secess-
ion of Panama and was to grant an indemnity of ;'>£5 ,U00,(JU0.
This "blackmail treaty", as Roosevelt termed it, reflected upon
the integrity of his course in iy03 in what he considered one
of the greatest acts of his entire administration. It made
little difference to him that the Senate persistently refused
to uphold President V/ilson in this matter. He felt so indig-
nant that on July 11, 1914, he retired as associate editor of
the Outlook because he could no longer support the administra-
tion in international relations, since this meant "the abandon-
ment of the interest and honor of America."
The animosity tov/ard Wilson was apparent in spite of the
•1
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reform measures which had "been enacted "before the close of the
year 1914, These Included the passage of an income tax, a
lov/er tariff, currency reform and increased control of the
trusts. Since most of this legislation had been recommended
in the platform of the Progressives, it might have "been expect-
ed that some word of approbation would have been expressed by
Roosevelt, but he was silent.
A further intangible cause of his dislilie for ?/ilson was
the difference in their conception of the Presidency, Roosevelt
"believed that the president should take the lead in guiding
public opinion in certain channels while 7/ilson would make no
move in a given course until he was certain that (or at least
it seemed so to Roosevelt) public opinion demanded it and would
support him whole heartedly. So Roosevelt fretted and raged to
see Wilson wait for the entire nation to demand participation
in the war. In an interviev/ given in 1915 to Julian Street, he
discussed the peculiar psychology of the American people. Under
smooth ernd eloquent leadership, they could be induced to put
aside the thing they knew they ought to do and satisfy their
national conscience with the soft words of the leader. But if
given direct and forceful leadership they would rise with en-
1
thusiasra and eagerness to do the thing they knew was right.
After the German announcement of her policy of submarine
warfare against all enemy vessels encountered m the "war zone"
about the British Isles, (February 1915) a wave of aporehension
Bwept over the United States, for if this policy were carried
1
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into effect it would meaii not only the destruction of property
of neutrals, tut also the possible drowning of American citi-
zens, even v/omen and children. The excuse given hy (xermany was
the British hlockade upon foodstuffs which had "been declared as
a result of the control of food in Germany hy the Grovernment.
The United States promptly warned the (Jerman government that
the proposed measure violated international law, and that shoulc
any harm result to American ships or citizens, Germany would be
held to "a strict accountahility," In reply, Germany insisted
that it was necessary to meet the British naval policy with
"sharp counter-measures" and that the Imperial government would
not he responsible for "any unfortunate accidents," This evas-
ive reply left the citizens of the United States in grave douht
as to whether Germany would heed in any degree the President's
warning - and if she did not, would Wilson lead the nation into
war?
The answer to this question was not long delayed, for on
the afternoon of I'ay 7th 1915, the Lusitania, the pride of the
British merchant marine, was torpedoed hy a German submarine
off the southeast coast of Ireland and sank in half an hour.
In all, 1,198 persons lost their lives including 114 American
citizens, A cry of horror and anguish went up from the United
States which was followed by a swift demand for punishment and
retribution. This was especially pronounced throughout the
eastern half of the country, but less noticeable in the Par
West, The German Ambassador, Count Von Bernstorff , who had
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warned the pul^lic in the newspaper not to sail on the Lusitania
presented to Secretary of State Bryan, the formal condolences
of the Grerman Emperor, but placing respons ihility for the dis-
aster on the British government which "through its plan of
starving the civilian population of Germany, has forced Germany
to resort to retaliatory measures,"
A few days later President ?/ilson delivered an address to
a "body of newly naturalized citizens in Convention Hall,
Philadelphia, in the course of which he made a remark which
amazed and perplexed the country. With no reference to the
Lusitania he said, "There is such a thing as a man being too
proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so
right that it does not need to convince others by force that is
is right," Separated from its context, where he had referred
to the consecration of United States to ideals that could not
be carried into effect through force, unless other methods had
failed, its meaning was quite different when taken alone. It
sounded as if the United States would not resort to force to
uphold its right, and Americans felt humiliated, Germany grev/
more arrogant: the Allies more contemptuous.
The question has often been raised whether President Wilsoti
should have broken off at once with Germany diplomatic relations.
What support would he have received in such an event? He him-
self believed, whether rightly or not, that the country did not
then desire v/ar with Germany. Sir Cecil Spring Rice felt that
the President was right. He told Sir Edward Grey that the

"great mass of people here are deeply anxious not to "be inYOlv-
ed and that V/ilson, on a visit to ITew York City, had "been re-
ceived with "a greater degree of popularity than has "been given
1
to anyone since Roosevelt," The President himself hy tempera-
ment was not inclined to listen to the vehement denands for
intervention, for he toiew that they were based on emotion, rathf
er than on deliberate judgment. Sx-President Taft favored cool
consideration and careful action. The pro -German element and
the pacifists were opposed to any positive threat of interven-
tion. The former "believed that the British blockade justified
Germany's submarine warfare: the latter were afraid even of
strong language in diplomatic notes, lest it lead to war,
Roosevelt was highly indignant at the outrage and felt
that he could no longer be loyal to the administration for it
meant "disloyalty to our self-interest." He had for some monthJ
been advocating a more vigorous policy toward Germany, Although
doubtless aware of British propaganda, he wised first to expose
German intrigue among those hyphenated Americans who, while en-
j07/ing the benefits of American citizenship "conspire against
the United States and do their utmost to promote the success of
Germany and to weaken the defense of this nation," Then he
considered it essential that this country be aroused to prepare
for war if we should be drawn into it. He highly approved the
plan of General Leonard Wood to organize a camp for volunteers
at Plattsburg, President V/ilson would not, however, officially
endorse any preparation which might be considered by the
1
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Germans as an unfriendly act. Most important of all, Roosevelt
labored unceasingly to arouse the spirit of the people to a
more vigorous defense of their rights, "I do not believe", he
said, "that the firm assertion of our rights means war, but in
any event, it is well to remember that there are things worse
1
tiian war,"
The news of the sinking of the Lusitania reached Roosevelt
towards the close of the libel suit which had been brought
against him by Williajn Barnes Jr. of Few Yorlc. During Roosevelt's
support of Harvey D. Hinman, the Progressive candidate for the
Governor of ITev; York in 1914, he had charged that Barnes, the
Republican boss in that state, had an alliance with Boss Murphy
of Tajranany Hall in the interest of corrupt politics. Barnes
was then forced to reply to this if his power was to- continue.
The next day, July 23, 1914, he brought suit for libel, The
case came to trial in Syracuse on April 19, 1915 and continued
till May 22nd.
Mr, Barnes' counsel, Mr, '.'/illiam M, Ivins , believed that
he could produce evidence that would drive Roosevelt forever
from political life, and many of the Colonel's enemies hoped he
would succeed. So confident was the chief counsel of the out-
come of the trial that he went about telling his acquaintances
that he had Roosevelt's doom in his hands. On the night before
the trial he said to Elihu Root, "I am going to Syracuse to-
morrov/ to nail Roosevelt's hide to the fence," "Ivins," answer-]
ed Root, "let me give you a piece of advice. I know Roosevelt
1
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and you want to be very sure that it is Hoosevelt's hide that
1
you get on the fence."
Roosevelt's political record for thirty years was suhject-
ed to the closest scrutiny, and letters, interviews, and
speeches were searched for evidence to prove that he had heen
guilty of political methods similar to those with which he had
charged Barnes. Roosevelt was a very self-confident v/itness
and made speeches and orations until halted hy the Court, He
dominated the court room and was complete master of himself and
of the proceedings. The newspapers published full reports of
the trial and were read with intensest interest by the whole
country. Long before the case went to the jury, the public had
decided that there was not a scrap of evidence to reflect upon
President Roosevelt's political integrity but that his criti-
cism of Barnes was absolutely truthful. The latter was also
denounced for giving Roosevelt such a fine opportunity to vin-
dicate himself for, as one critic said, "Of all the blundering
lunatics I have ever known, Barnes is the worst. Here v;e had
Roosevelt, after his candidacy against Taft, dead and buried
politically. We were rid of him for all time. TTow Barnes has
not only opened the door for hira to come back., but he has push-
ed him through to the front of the stage and made him a greater
E
popular idol than ever,"
<Vhen the evidence v/as all in ani the case was ready to go
to the jury, the first news of the sinking of the Lusitania
arrived, '.Vhat connection would any comment that Roosevelt migh';
1 ^ —=———___ = _ =
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make have upon the outcome of the law suit in view of the fact
that there were two or possibly tnree irieii oi German "birth upon
the jury? Roosevelt had previously "been so outspoken that he
had antagonized many German-American citizens. V/ould any fur-
ther denunciations cause him to lose the law suit, involving
the defense of his reputation and perhaps heavy damages^
During the night of May 7th - 8th, he was aroused hy his
host, Mr, Horace Vvilkinson, who told him that a nev/spaper re-
porter had more complete details of the disaster to relate and
would like a statement from him. After hearing of the extent
of the tragedy, Roosevelt immediately denounced it as murder
and piracy, only on a vaster scale than old time pirates ever
practised. He felt that the United States could not refrain
from taking action, for her own self respect demanded it. Al-
most immediately he gave out to the press advance copies of an
editorial v/hich was to appear in the Metropolitan Magazine,
with which he was nov/ connected, entitled "Murder on the High
Seas," Greatly to Roosevelt's surprise, however, the Jury re-
turned a verdict in his favor in spite of these utterances.
The next few months stirred Roosevelt's soul to its depths
for he felt that the President should hold Germany to "strict
accountability" aM then, if ever, was the time for action, not
words. But the President was then beginning his long diplomat-
ic struggle with Germany at the end of which he acknowledged
himself to Colonel House (September 1915) "Ify chief puzzle is
to determine when patience ceases to "be a virtue," Roosevelt

felt that the country was siriking to depths of ignominy, and
resented l^eenly the President's "adroitness in phrase making
when he had no intention of putting deeds "behind the phrases,"
He gave vent to his pent up indignation in a series of magazine
articles on "Fear God and Take Your Own Part", "America First",
"Dual Nationality", "Preparedness", "A Phrase or a Fact". He
thought Wilson had become "the popular pacifist hero" supported
"by "the professional pacifists, the fluh-dubs and the molly-
coddles." ^Vhen Bryan, in protest over the sending of the sec-
ond Lusitania note to Germany, resigned as Secretary of State,
Roosevelt was sure that the President v/as going to adopt a
sterner attitude until he discovered that the point at issue he-|
tween the President and his Secretary was "merely the proper
1
point of dilution of tepid milk and water."
So the year 1915 drew to a close with Roosevelt in open
opposition to the President's war policy, with only a limited
preparedness program "being adopted, and a campaign of sabotage
instigated by German sympathizers and Mexicans, what then was
the result of all of this on the Progressive Party? First it
was bringing forward wholly different party issues. Domestic
questions were submerged in the depth of the foreign crisis.
Roosevelt had taken up the new issues of preparedness, oppos-
ition to pacifism and a militant 100^ Americanism, not from any
partisan viev/point but yet to a degree that caused many, such
as Miss Jane Addams, David Starr Jordan and others to drop
quietly out of the Progressive ranks. Furthermore his oppositidln
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to the President's war polios'" was really restoring Mm to the
leadership of the Repuhlican party. Even those 7/ho condemned
his course most hitterly in 1912 nov/ hegan looking to him for
the aggressive leadersliip which they did not find in the 7/hite
House, He "became the spokesman on all questions relating to
the war and the conduct of the administration, perhaps "because
no one else ventured to speak so freely and so courageously.
This continued until the campaign of 1916 which was really a
referendum on the leadership of V/ilson and Roosevelt, with for-
eign policies as the main issue of the campaign.
The Progressive leaders, like Beveridge, realized the new
respect which was accorded Roosevelt in the Repu"blican party
and felt that unless he came out soon with a tremendous hugle
"blast calling the Progressives to aims, he wouldn't have any-
body to call to arms - or to put it in terms of politics, he
1
wouldn't have any"body to deliver,' The TTew York Progressives
practically dominated a conference of party leaders, which was
held in TTew York in July 1915 and secured the adoption of a
resolution authorizing the party in each state to take its ov/n
course locally. Beveridge considered this the same thing as
dissolving the party and going over to the enemy without terms
either as to platform or candidates. Thus releasing each state
to do as it liked was not only dissolving the party and throw-
ing away all its assets, "but it did not even have the dignity
of self respect, When the Hew York Progressives were consider-
ing a return to the Repu"blican Party, Roosevelt expressed his
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appreciation of their previous support, gave them his "blessing,
iDut added that if his advice were asked he would advise Pro-
gressives to stay with the party.
It was this same group of New York Progressives who pro-
posed that the Progressive Convention should be held at the
same time and in the same city as the Republican. The reason
for this strategy was perfectly apparent. Beveridge felt that
it would place the Progressive party in a ridiculous light and
that the Progressives, if in earnest, ought to meet before the
Republicans
•
On December 17, 1915, a gathering of influential Republi-
cans was held at the home of Judge Gary of the United States
Steel Corporation, at 856 Fifth Avenue, New York. Colonel
Roosevelt was there, also Mr, George Perkins, and August Belmont
Jacob H. Schiff
,
George F. Baker, A. Barton Hepburn, Frank A.
Vanderllp, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Daniel Guggenheim, Clsirence
Mackay and George Cortelyou, \'rhen the press found out about it,
Judge Gary explained that it was given to discuss preparedness.
But men like Beveridge with practical knowledge of politics,
never doubted afterwards that Roosevelt would seek the Republican
1
nomination in 1916,
L
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Chapter IX
By agreement iDetv/een the two national committees the
national conventions of both parties assembled in Chicago on
the same day (June 7, 1916) in the hope that the two parties
might unite upon a single candidate and platform, and thus de-
feat the Democratic nominee. They met in separate halls hut
carried on extended negotiations, with a viev/ to healing the
schism of 1912. Each convention opened with a calculating gaze
upon the other, both manoeuvring for the advantage in the
choice of the candidate. The uncertainty centered about Roose-
velt, whether the Republicans would accept him as the fusion
candidate, and if not, what he and the Progressives v;ould do.
From the Progressive Convention an invitation was sent to
the Republicans for the appointment of joint committees for
conference, and this was promptly accepted. The Republicans
chose Senator Smoot of Utah, Senator Crane of Massachusetts,
Senator Borah of Idaho, President Butter of Columbia and A.R»
Johnson of Ohio, The Progressives selected Oovernor Johnson of
California, George '.V, Perkins of ITev/ York, Horace B. V/ilkinson
of New York, John il, Parker of Louisiana, and Charles J.
Bonaparte of Maryland, They conferred in a spirit of good will-
but as the Progressives v/ere convinced that Roosevelt was the
one man on whom the two parties could unite logically, with any !
hope of success, and as Senator Smoot bluntly announced that
his party would accept any one but Roosevelt, no common agreemei t

could "be reached. Their report was then carried "back to each
convention, but the Republicans took no notice of it. Again
the comnittee went to work, the Republicans proposing as a com-
promise candidate Mr. Charles Hvans Hughes. But this time the
Progressives v/ould have none of it. They were there to nominate
their own beloved leader, and they intended to do it.
'iVhy was the Republican Convention so opposed to the accept-
ance of Hoosevelt as the fusion candidate? Was it due to a
sincere belief that they could not win under his leadership? It
was perhaps the Republican leaders, rather than the rank and
file, who were opposed to his nomination, and they still bore
resentment because of his action in 1912. Their sole idea seem-j
ed to be that the convention should nominate a "regular Republi-
can." They apparently feared that the delegates might get out
of hand, and if so, lead a stampede to Roosevelt. So they pro-
ceeded in a cautious and subdued manner, determined not to ac-
cept him but they were not united on anyone else. Another con-
sideration which may have influenced some Republicans was the
antagonism of the German vote and the Irish and the pacifist
vote which he had aroused by his outspoken criticism.
Were not the Republican leaders, in refusing the olive
branch of reconciliation held out to them by the Progressives,
really preparing the way for their own defeat? If Roosevelt
had decided to head the Progressive ticket again, could ohey
have won in spite of the third party? This was the bluff which
the Progressive leaders hoped to carry through successfully and

thus force the nomination of their heloved leader on the Repuh-
ilicana. But these negotiations failed, and v/ith them all hope
j
jOf the Progressives died, for the Old Guard were too wary to he
I
jcaught hy such strategy. They were confident that Hoosevelt
was through with every kind of personal politics, and that he
had not the slightest intention of accepting the nomination of
a third party which had dwindled to simply a party of protest.
Unless he could have the nomination of the two parties which
would practically insure his election, he would not consider
the candidacy. This opinion was not mere guess work, for appar-
ently the Republican leaders had this information from sources
so close to Roosevelt that it was indisputable.
Among the other candidates considered in the Republican
convention was Elihu Root of New York, Theodore E, Burton of
Ohio, Albert B. Cummins of Iowa, John W. 7/eeks of IvTassachusetts,
and Charles E, Hughes of llev/ York, then a Justice of the Sup-
reme Court of the United States. The leaders would have pre-
ferred Root but he probably could not carry the 7/est; Cummins
had been regarded as a radical in the East since his attack on
i
i
the Payne-Aldr ich Tariff in 1909. They had no desire for
Hughes but there were certain considerations in his favor; he
had had no part in the factional struggle of 1912, his record
as former Governor of Mew York was progressive and ought to ap-
|peal to the 'Vest, and as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he had
not antagonized any of the hyphenated American groups. So with
little show of enthusiasm he was nominated on the third ballot.
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The vice -presidential nomination went to FairlDanlcs, who had
held that office during the second Roosevelt administration*
The platform of the Hepuhlican party was brief, matter of
fact, and conventional. It gave a vivid descriiotion of horrors
and outrages in Mexico and denounced Wilson's "indefensible
methods of interference" in the internal affairs of that coun-
try: it pledged aid in the restoration of order, with adequate
protection of American interests. The party favored neutrality
in the European war and charged that the Wilson administration
had resorted to " phra se -making and shiftly expedients," which
had destroyed our influence abroad. Preparedness was emphasiz-
ed, although in rather vague terms. The Underwood Tariff was
declared a failure because of the decline in revenue and because
the cost of living had not been curbed. The general stand of
the platform was reactionary; does this indicate that the party
convention was likewise?
There was apparently little change in the Republican party
since 1912. They had revised none of their professed principles
and had not by a single act or declaration betrayed a leaning
towards liberalism. Though the Old Guard were not so obviously
in control of the 1916 convention, yet they were all there.
Lodge, Cannon, Penrose, Smoot, Crane and the rest; in fact the
party had not dismissed any of its objectionable leaders. They
had refused to consider Roosevelt because they kne-.v from exper-
ience that the bosses could not rule while he was in office.
Hughes they did not like much better but they accepted him

reluctantly. Their attitude towards the Progressive overtures
of reconciliation was evidence of the reactionary control of
the convention, \Yhen the Progressives suggested a conference
coinmittee, they appointed one, but the very character of the
men chosen, such as Smoot or Crane, made co-operation with the
Progressives almost impossihle. Having appointed a committee
and received its report, they then proceeded to ignore it with
studied indifference. Mr, V/illiam Dana Orcut t, a life long
Republican and the biographer of Senator Burrows of Michigan,
attended every session of this convention, hoping to see a
recognition that the party was in sympathy with the trend of
the time. But at the close of the convention he was convinced
that the leaders were dead to their opportunities and either
jlblind or indifferent to the demands of the people. The party
had its chance to return to pov/er , under better and cleaner
auspices than at any time since its early days, when Roosevelt
patriotically declined the Progressive nomination in 1916 6Uid
the Progressive Party yielded to the demand for a mutual vic-
tory. It had been the intention of the Republican leaders so
to unite, he believed, but as the campaign progressed, they
thought that they could elect their candidate without the
I;
[assistance of the Progressives and thus keep the patronage of
II
^
'the party entirely within their own hands. This was the final
example of selfishness which received its just rebuke in the
lelection of 1916,
The delegates to the Progressive Convention had the same
1
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earnest enthusiasm and loyalty that had characterized the
gathering in 1912, When Raymond Rohins, the temporary chair-
man, first mentioned the name of Theodore Roosevelt, there v/as
a demonstration that lasted an hour and a half. It was with
the greatest difficulty that they could he restrained from
placing his name in nomination at once, even "before a confer-
ence committee could consult with the Republican party. ?/hen
it was evident that both parties could not agree upon him as a
compromise candidate, Roosevelt wrote the convention urging
that they both unite on Henry Cabot Lodge.
The amazement of the Progressives was almost overwhelming.
No one present will ever forget the white tense faces of the
leaders on the platform when this was being read, or the dis-
may, - for it came as a total surprise. It seemed to the dele-
gates like a betrayal, - a spurning of their love and loyalty.
Lodge could never have been nominated, for he was the anti-
thesis of Progressive ideals. Ee had always hated the Bull
Moose movement, although personally a friend of its founder,
LIr. Bainbridge Colby then placed the name of Roosevelt be-
fore the convention and Hiram Johnson seconded the nomination
and called upon the Colonel to meet his responsibilities.
John M. Parker, a former Democrat of Louisiana was named as
Vice President. In a few hours Roosevelt's reply was received
declining the nomination pending a conference with Hughes, It
was positively cold-blooded in its tone, with not a note of
comradeship for the loyal men and women who adored him and had

117
followed Mm for four years. The comments of Progressive lead-
ers expressed their disappointment. Beveridge wrote to one of
his friend, "I think that history has not one single example
of a party or movement which was used so cold-bloodedly and
wrecked so cyncially and selfishly as the Progressive Party has
1
been used and wrecked."
;vhat then were Roosevelt's real motive in declining the
nomination of the party which he had "been instrumental in form-
ing only four years previously? He would not permit any fac-
tional fight to he made for his nomination hy the Republican
Party because it would be a mistake to nominate him unless the
country was ready to follow him in the campaign of preparedness
and militant Americanism. For a year and a half Roosevelt had
been a bitter critic of the administration considering Wilson
the worst president since Buchanan. His defeat was essential
to national honor and defense. If by alluring the Progressives
back into the Republican fold, Roosevelt could accomplish this,
iras not the sacrifice of party to be preferred to that of
country?
Although Roosevelt did not particularly like Hughes, he
accepted his policies, and labored to secure his election, in
order to defeat President 7/ilson. Hughes himself did not prove
a particularly strong candidate, for his speeches seemed lack-
ing in the ver^r qualities of vigur and militancy which he was
advocating. He was vague and indefinite, and relied upon at-
tacks on the administration rather than on a constructive,
_
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positive foreign policy. Roosevelt was in direct contrast to
Hughes in all these respects, and although his personal invec-
tive may have lost Hughes a fev; votes, yet his efforts were
welcomed by the Republican party throughout the campaign.
The decisive factor in the final vote would he the extent
to v/hich Roosevelt could induce the Progressives to support the
RepuDlican candidate. Could he deliver' the party as a whole
or would some turn to Wilson? Among the leaders there was no
unanimity of opinion. Mr. Bainhridge Colby who derided the
idea that the Republican Party of 1916 had reformed itself since
1912, announced that he would support 7/ilson. He thought
Hughes' speech of acceptance made only perfunctory references
to Progressive principles and was without any real sympathy
with the movement. Many of the ranfe and file of the Progress-
ives agreed with him, especially in the West. Of the two csin-
didates, Hughes and Wilson, these westerners considered Wilson
the more truly progressive and the more positive in his foreign
policy. They gave him Kansas and California, which v/itri better
campaign strategy might have been won for the Republicans,
Other Progressive leaders adopted a different attitude and
agreed to follow the recommendation of the Progressive National
Committee which met in Chicago, June 26th to fill the vacancy
caused by Colonel Roosevelt's declination. After an all -day
fight in the Committee, thirty-two of the members agreed to
place Hughes' name at the head of their ticket: nine members
did not vote and six declined to go with the majority, and
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turned later to the support of Wilson. Colonel Parker led the
fight against the merger. He had lahored to "build up Progress-
ive sentiment and defeat the traditional one party attitude of
the south. Having met with some measure of success, and having
burned all his political hridges hehind him, he refused to with-j
draw as candidate for Vice President, and went through the en-
tire campaign as a Progressive,
On the same day that the action of the Progressive Nation-
al Committee was made public, Roosevelt came out with a person-
al statement which was really the obituary of the Progressive
Party, He paid high compliment to his fellow partisans, but
intimated that the Progressives had already rendered all the
service they could to the country as an independent party and
that the chief duty at present was to rescue the nation from
the peril of another four years of Democratic administration
which he thought the worst administration since Buchanan's time.
Under the circumstances they should not sulk because he reject-
ed their nomination, but should face the situation good humor-
edly and with common sense considering the highest interest of
1
the American people. The majority of the Progressive leaders
accepted this and announced their endorsement of Hughes.
Beveridge liked Hughes personally, but it was not until after
a lengthy conference with him that he was willing to make a
public announcement of his return to the Republican Party,
Beveridge had worked so devotedly for four years for the build-
ing up of a truly progressive party that it was with considerabllb
The Independent, July 10, 1916

disillusionment that he again campaigned for a Repuhlican nom-
inee.
After Hughes had accepted the endorsement of the Progress-
ives, several conferences v/ere had with him hy leaders of the
Progressive movement. They wanted to inform him of all the
situations where any soreness still lingered because of the
1912 fight. In the campaign trip v/hich had been planned for
him to the Pacific Coast, he would visit California where for
six years Governor Johnson had annually defeated the Old Guard.
He was warned that Johnson was the strongest political leader
in the entire state. It was suggested t?iat one man from the
party organization of Republicans and one from the Progressives
accompany Hughes on this trip to give him information and also
to see that both sides were represented on the conmittees and
delegations which received him. Had this practical suggestion
"been accepted, the outcome of the election might have been very
1
different,
Hughes went west without much idea of the dissatisfaction
on both Progressive and Republican sides, V/hen he reached
California he found an unusual situation. Governor Johnson was
running in the Republican primaries for the nomination of
United States Senator and was also endeavoring to support
Hughes. He urged his old following to support the Republican
candidate because he was really a Progressive. But Hughes pro-
ceeded to align himself with the machine which Johnson had
"beaten every year for six years. As if that were not enough.
120
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he pulDlicly greeted the leader of this defeated faction as
"California's favorite son." The Old Guard cleverly prevented
his even meeting Governor Johnson. California wondered if he
could he influenced to such a degree by this weak faction, what
he would do when he came up against the strong Old Guard in the
Senate. It v/as manifestly impossible for Governor Johnson to
do any more to help Hughes carry the state, and although he won
the senatorship by over 300,000 votes, Hughes lost the state by
only a few thousand.
The Democratic Convention, which met at St. Louis on June
14th was marked by a spirit of harmony and enthusiasm. Presi-
dent ;vilson and Vice President Marshall were renominated by ac-
clamation. The platform enumerated the legislative achievements
of the preceding three years and challenged a comparison of
their record v/ith that of any party at any other time. The
Chairman, Senator Ollie James, of Kentucky, pointed with pride
to two amendments added to the federal Constitution in 1913, -
the one to tax the wealth of the country through the income tax
the other to free the Senate from the control of the great in-
terests by making it elective by the people.
Not content with its record of achievement the platform
declared for still other reforms, which v/ere identical with the
Progressive platform of 1912, This was undoubtedly^ a bid for
Progressive support, which the Republicans v/ere also seeking.
Such measures as the Federal Reserve Act, the inheritance tax,
the rural credits bill, the child labor bill and the workman's

compensation act were especially pleasing to the Progressives,
The platform praised the diplomatic victories of the
President in his dealings with the belligerent countries of
Europe and his refusal to intervene in Mexico, It advocated
increases in the army and a reserve of trained soldiers.
The campaign did not turn upon domestic issues, however,
nor the record of the Democratic party, but rather upon the
approval of the President's foreign policy. The real question
before the voters was whether in view of world conditions,
Wilson or Hughes would make the better president. Wilson had
the advantage of being in' power, so that he could "make the
nev/s." He had a foreign policy which was known to the voters
and was thoroughly familiar with the complicated questions which
had arisen in the preceding four years so that his supporters
could strongly urge the danger of "changing horses while cross-
ing a stream." The Democrats freely admitted that relations
with Mexico were still unsatisfactory but they argued that a
firmer policy v;ould have meant war at a time when the European
situation was especially critical. The President's patience in
dealing with Germany was also praised and the slogan "He kept
us out of the war" undoubtedly won thousands of votes, espec-
ially in the states where women balloted. Senator James in the
Democratic convention declared that "without orphaning a single
American mother, or shedding a drop of blood, V/oodrow Wilson
wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded over a
battlefield a recognition of American rights and an agreement to

American demands,"
In the Forth East the trend of puhlic opinion was decided-
ly against the President, His friendly attitude toward labor
unions aroused the distrust of capitalists: business men dis-
liked his policies and complained that those 7;ho surrounded him
were incapable, especially some in his cabinet. His foreign
policy toward Mexico and Germany v;as unsatisfactory. His early
opposition to preparedness and the half hearted measures he
finally did adopt were much criticized by the Republican cam-
paign orators. But when the President countered by demanding
of his opponent what he would have done differently regarding
Mexico and Germany, Hughes was decidedly vague. He would not
commit himself to an immediate declaration of war against eith-
er, for his party managers were anxious not to offend foreign-
torn voters. Whatever chance the Democrats might have in the
election lay in the personal strength of Wilson with the mass-
es, especially in the South and west of the Mississippi where
the Progressive spirit was strong. Here he was regarded as the
greatest Democrat since Jaclcson,
The election proved to be one of the closest and most
unique contests in our history, and several days elapsed before
the result was definitely known. The early returns from east-
ern and some middle western states seemed to indicate a victory
for Hughes, but the results from the far West were unexpectedly
favorable to the President, In several states the vote was so
close that a recount was necessary, J'inally it was evident tha'
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the outcome hinged on the votes of California and Minnesota,
either of which would turn the scale. The Minnesota recount
still gave Hughes twelve electoral votes on a popular plurality
of only 396, California's thirteen electoral votes finally
went to the Democrats hy a narrow margin and this gave the
election to ViTilson. Of the total number of electoral votes
(531) a majority of 266 are required to elect. Hughes received
254, Wilson 277. More than eighteen and a half million voters,
almost one-fourth of them women, expressed their choice at the
polls. The popular vote was: 7/ilson 9,128,837; Hughes
8,536,380, Parker, running on the Progressive ticket for the
vice -presidency, with no candidate for the presidency, received
42,836 votes.
Aside from the closeness of the contest the outcome was
remarkable in several respects. Each candidate received a
larger popular vote than had ever before been cast, that of
Wilson being two million larger than any other Democratic can-
didate in the history of the country. Wilson won without Few
York or any of the other large eastern states, finding his
support in the iiouth and Far West. Hughes carried the East and
Middle West. In all the important industrial communities ex-
cept Ohio he was victorious, while the rural and agricultural
regions supported the President. The Democrats were saved from
complete defeat only by their gains in the farming states v/hich
were usually Republican. The people here regarded the Presi-
dent as a real Progressive and they liked his pacific foreign

policy. Possibly the high prices of their farm products and
the degree of prosperity hitherto unparallelled may have heen a
factor in their choice.
The President everywhere proved stronger than his party,
for the Democratic majority in the Senate fell from sixteen to
ten# In the House the Democrats failed to retain control,
electing 214 memhers as did the Republicans. The "balance of
power fell to a very few independents. In the states the hon-
ors were about even.
'.Vhat did the election prove about the Progressive party?
What became of the two million votes which they polled in 1914?
Pirst Hughes had not been successful in reconciling the Pro-
gressives as he had hoped to do. In most states he ran far be-
hind the local Republican candidates. This does not necessar-
ily imply that he was a weak candidate or that any other man
would have made a better showing. It probably indicates that
the Progressives v/ere not willing to go back into the Republi-
can party which seemed to them to be dominated by reactionaries.
So they either voted for V/ilson or remained away from the polls
It is estimated that from a third to a half of their number may
have supported Wilson. The Republican-Progressive breach of
1912 had not been healed though the Progressives as a party
virtually disappeared before the election.

Chapter X
The Progressive Party was one of the shortest -lived polit-
ical organizations in the history of the United States. Created
in the year 1912 out of the elements of the Progressive move-
ment, it polled 4,000,000 votes in that year. Pour years later,
it ceased its corporate existence, and expired. TIThat were the
reasons for the disappearance of such a vigorous and flourish-
ing party?
Pirst it must "be aclmowledged that it was a one-man party.
This was not so apparent at the time as in retrospective re-
flection. V.Tiatever motives may have influenced its founder, -
whether thwarted ambition or the protest towards reactionary
methods of presidential nominations or the desire to unite all
the liberal elements in the country for the attainment of a
program of social and economic justice, Theodore Roosevelt was
the motivating power of the Progressive Party. No explanation
of party decline can he considered apart from him. Just as he
called the party into existence, so he held within his control
the power of its life and death during the critical years of
1913-1916, and hy his acquiescence its sudden end came.
After the election of 1912, Roosevelt seemed to have lost
interest in the party, although he retained a nominal connec-
tion with it until the campaign of 1916. By temperament and
training he was an idealist and a reformer, but his judgment as
a practical politician was never obscured. V/hen the party was

defeated in 1912, he failed to see much promise for it in the
future. While others dreamed of building gradually upon the
foundation, which was then laid, he was ready to abandon the
effort. When a friend called at Sagamore Hill soon after 1912,
and talked of victory in 1916, Roosevelt* s reply was, "I thought
you were a better politician. The fight is over. Vife are beat-
en. There is only one thing to do and that is to go back to
the Republican Party You can't hold a r>arty like the Progress-
1
Ive Party together there are no loaves and fishes."
Perhaps he discounted the tremendous hold which he had
upon the affection and loyalty of his followers and perhaps
also he minimized the tenacity with which the idealists would
cling to the aspirations v/hich the party expressed. Roosevelt
never seemed to appreciate fully the type of a reformer who
would stand alone, if need be, for a cause: with him there must
"be some actual measure of success attained or the effort must be
abandoned. (Perhaps this is why LaPollette and. Roosevelt, while
seeking to promote a common cause never really were affiliated
in spirit, ) So Roosevelt was not interested in the continuance
of the Progressive Party if it were to become only a minority
party of protest.
The popular feeling among the Progressives was that their
leader had deserted them in the hour of battle, but some have
asserted that the opposite was true, that the rank and file had
deserted their general, pointing in support of this view to
the loss of over 2,000,000 votes from 1912 to 1914, But if the
Pringle, Henry F,, Theodore Roosevelt, 571
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general sounds no "bugle "blast and orders no forward charge, is
it strange if his troops desert? Perhaps his failure to do so
was due to the fact that he felt that the people had grown tir-
ed of his leadership and that when a leader *s day is past the
greatest service he can render is to step aside and leave the
ground clear for a successor. Such views may have been express
ed in dejection of spirit, but on several occasions he voiced
his opinion that the people as a whole v/ere heartily tired of
him and his views.
If the Progressive Party, which had polled more votes in
191£ than the Republicans, had succeeded in continuing this
increase, there would have been a chance for it to become one
of the two great parties of the country. The political trad-
ition of the United States had seemed to show that voters pre-
fer two parties only. Third parties have always been short-
lived and full of trouble. Hoosevelt expressed this view when
he wrote, "Finally we have to deal with certain political habits
that have become very deep-rooted in our people. The average
man is a Democrat or a Republican and he is this as a matter of
faith, not as a matter of morals. — He has grown to accept as
co-relative to this attitude entire willingness to punish his
party by voting for the opposite party. Having done this, he
returns to his own party, — Then, there is the perfectly pro-
per feeling that there is only room for two parties, the party
in power and the party in opposition. ',7e were in the position
of the Free Soil party, not of the early Republican Party."

RooseTelt continues to state his views on still another
factor in the party defeat of 1914: "Finally, in this election
the fundamental question that interested the average man was
the purely economic question of how he could best shape condi-
tions so that he could earn his own living. The workingman was
not interested in social or industrial justice." Neither was
the materialist, who lac"ked the vision to see "beyond the heat-
en path in v/hich he was accustomed to travel. The platform of
1912 may have also been for the average man, too advanced along
the lines of loftiness of aim and high aspirations for social
1
and economic progress.
At the opposite extreme were the visionary well meaning
reformers who gloried in such lofty aims; some of them were
cranks who "tended to go into sheer lunacy." P.oosevelt believ-
ed that the majority of the practical idealists of the country
were with him, but he also felt hampered by the lack of practi-
cal politicians, although he praised the upright disinterested
service of his good, fine lieutenants.
In strong opposition to the Progressive Party were cer-
tain groups whose influence was felt increasingly as time went
by. Both the old political organizations were able to exert a
tremendous pov/er because they controlled ninety-nine percent
at the very least of the corporate wealth of the country, and
therefore the great majoritj^ of the nev/spaDers. The Socialists
also fought as bitterly as did the representatives of the two
old parties, for the Progressives stood equally against
1
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government by a plutocracy and government by a mob. In addi-
tion to these groups were other citizens who realized the need
of reform but feared that radicals were getting control of the
new party and were seeking to overthrow constitutional limita-
tions by such policies as initiative, referendum, and recall of
Judicial decisions.
If the Democrats had chosen a candidate of reactionary
tendencies in 1912 and in 1916, the prospect of success for the
Progressive Party would have increased proportionately, but the
measures achieved by President Wilson in that interval made a
tremendous appeal to the Progressives of the middle '.Vest, and
they proved to be the decisive factor in the election of 1916,
When the 7/orld War began in 1914, the Progressive Party
put their emphasis on new issues to the neglect of the old.
Preparedness and militant Americanism were emphasized, rather
than domestic problems. This type of propaganda alienated some
Progressives while undoubtedly it attracted other followers.
Consequently with the substitution of new issues for the old,
the most that remained for the originators of the party was an
intense personal devotion to their leader. V/hen he refused to
be their standard bearer again, logically the alternative was
dissolution of the party. There are many who feel that in the
choice that Roosevelt made at this time he reached the heights
of self-sacrificing patriotism. He consented to the elimin-
ation of the party he founded because it had become a dangerous
derelict in the path of political progress. He believed it
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might have again wrecked the chances of success for the party
which seemed at that time most likely to prepare the country
adequately to meet the peril of a foreign foe. In comparison
with that danger, the fortune of a political party sank out of
sight f

Chapter XI
In considering the results of the Progressive party, the
most apparent was the change of party in 1912 when the Democrats
nnder 7/oodrow Wilson came into power and became under his lead-
ership an aggressive force for reform. In 1916 it "brought ahoul
the nomination of Charles E, Hughes "by the Republicans, who were
compelled to yield to public opinion in the choice of their
candidate. But of far greater moment for the future was the
momentum given by the Progressives to the movement for reform.
It did not originate these reforms but it fairly loosened the
public mind to a range of ideas which had long struggled for a
hearing. The majority of the planks of the party platform of
1912 have since become incorporated in those of the two large
parties, and to a large extent liave since been enacted in state
or national legislation. Lleasures of social and industrial re-
form have been passed, while woman suffrage, direct election of
senators by the people, the initiative, referendum and direct
primaries for presidential nomination have given to the people
a larger measure of control over the government. In the Nation-
al Convention of the Republicans held at Kansas City in 1928,
Robert LaFollette, Jr., made the statement that thirty-two of
the thirty-five planks first offered by his father in 1908 have
since been made law. Though given as a personal tribute to his
father, it may also eulogize the progressive reformers of these
years.

In this great movement for reform the Progressives had
tafcen a worthy part. They had focused the clear, direct rays
of puhlic opinion upon much needed reforms of political and
industrial life. They had initiated measures of social and
economic justice and had sought to restore to the people a
more direct control over the government. Ilhe-y had advocated
ideals of civic righteousness and social hetterraent which, to
whatever extent they have "been accomplished, either through
the instrumentality of the Progressive Party alone or through
another, have "brought to thousands new opportunities for "the
pursuit of happiness."
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